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The Sham Exception to the Noerr-
Pennington Doctrine
By Christina M. Spizer*
Introduction
The First Amendment to the Constitution sets forth several free-
doms basic to our society, including the freedoms of religion, speech,
press, and assembly.' Buried within this amendment is a right equally
crucial to our governmental system: "the right to petition the Govern-
ment for a redress of grievances." 2 The freedoms of speech, press, as-
sembly, and religion protect and sanction an individual's self-
expression and criticism of the government; the right to petition guar-
antees that criticism may be expressed directly to the government. This
First Amendment right "is logically implicit in and fundamental to the
very idea of a republican form of governance,"3 and is an essential
component of our democratic system.4
As with the other First Amendment freedoms, the right to petition
the government is not absolute;' petitioning activity will not always be
afforded First Amendment protection.6 For instance, an individual
may exercise the right to petition solely to effect an anticompetitive
purpose.7 When the underlying goal of such petitioning is to interfere
directly with a competitor, and the right to petition is merely the means
* B.A., 1980, University of California, Berkeley; member, third year class.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. The full text of the First Amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law re-
specting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging
the freedoms of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and
petition the Government for a redress of grievances." Id
Although the right to petition is explicitly guaranteed, it is "buried" within the First
Amendment if considered in light of American constitutional jurisprudence. See infra notes
25-27 and accompanying text.
3. Stern v. United States Gypsum, Inc., 547 F.2d 1329, 1342 (7th Cir. 1977) (discussing
United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1875)).
4. See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1875); Eastern Railroad Presi-
dents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 137 (1961).
5. See, e.g., Haig v. Agee, 433 U.S. 280 (1981); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476
(1957).
6. See California Motor Transport v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 513-16 (1971);
see infra notes 29-43 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
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to that end, then the First Amendment will not shield the petitioner
from liability under the Sherman Act.8
In Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight,
Inc.,9 the Supreme Court observed that the right to petition the govern-
ment might not be afforded First Amendment protection if it was not a
genuine effort to influence the government."° The Court classified the
spurious exercise of the right to petition as "sham" activity.I In Noerr,
the Court recognized that purported petitioning fell outside of the First
Amendment's purview,'2 but did not propose a standard by which to
identify unprotected petitioning activity. The task of promulgating an
effective standard for defining sham conduct has fallen to the lower
federal courts; resolution of this definitional problem has proven
difficult.' 3
This Note examines the basis and rationale of the Noerr-Pen-
nington doctrine'4 and the sham exception. Part I presents a history of
the roles that the right to petition and the Sherman Act play in our
society, and discusses how the exercise of the right to petition may vio-
late the Sherman Act. The development of the Noerr-Pennington doc-
8. See, e.g., Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 380 (1973), reh'g
denied, 411 U.S. 910 (1974), see infra notes 65-66 and accompanying text; Caifornia Motor
Transport, 404 U.S. at 513, see infra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
The pertinent provisions of the Sherman Act are § I and § 2. 15 U.S.C. §§ I, 2 (1982).
Section 1 provides, in part, that "[e]very contract, combination ... or conspiracy, in re-
straint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is ... ille-
gal." Section 2's prohibitions apply to "[e]very person who shall monopolize, or attempt to
monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any
part of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations."
9. 365 U.S. at 127.
10. Id at 144.
11. Id
12. In Noerr the Supreme Court discussed the importance of interpreting the antitrust
laws in a manner that does not constrain the free exercise of First Amendment rights: "To
hold that the government retains the power to act in [a] representative capacity and yet hold,
at the same time, that the people cannot freely inform the government of their wishes would
impute to the Sherman Act a purpose to regulate, not business activity, but political activity,
a purpose which would have no basis whatever in the legislative history of the Act." Noerr,
365 U.S. at 138. The Court then elaborated on this statutory interpretation of the Sherman
Act and noted the constitutional priority afforded to the right to petition: "The right to
petition is one of the freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights, and we cannot, of course,
lightly impute to Congress an intent to invade these freedoms." Id
13. See, e.g., Clipper Exxpress v. Rocky Mountain Motor Tariff Bureau, Inc., 674 F.2d
1252 (9th Cir. 1982) and cases cited therein. See also Metro Cable Co. v. CATV of Rock-
ford, Inc., 516 F.2d 220 (7th Cir. 1975); Semke v. Enid Automobile Dealers Ass'n, 456 F.2d
1361 (10th Cir. 1972).
14. The right to petition immunity is commonly referred to as the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine. This doctrine is named for two Supreme Court cases-Eastern Railroad Presi-
dents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 127 (1961) and United Mine Workers v.
Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965)-that discussed the conffict between the exercise of the
right to petition and the Sherman Act. See infra notes 53-59 and accompanying text.
trine and the sham exception is discussed in part II; part III critiques
the Ninth Circuit's application of sham analysis in Clipper Exxpress v.
Rocky Mountain Motor Tari Bureau, Inc.5 Finally, part IV proposes
a functional standard for courts to determine whether petitioning activ-
ity falls within the sham exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.
I. The Societal Function of the Sherman Act and the Right to
Petition
A. The Antitrust Statutes
The antitrust statutes' 6 were designed to protect and promote the
competitive processes in the American economy.' 7 The general objec-
tive of the Sherman' and Clayton Acts, 19 "promotion of competition
in open markets,"'2 reflects a policy which is a primary feature of pri-
vate enterprise. Thus, "[mlost Americans have long recognized that op-
portunity for market access and fostering of market rivalry are basic
tenets of our faith in competition as a form of economic
organization." 2'
Congress passed the Sherman Act in 1890,22 primarily in response
to the public distrust of large business combinations. Fear of the trusts
was pervasive; a common perception was that reforms were needed to
curb the trusts' wealth and economic power.23 During Congressional
debate on the Act, Senator Sherman observed that the trusts permeated
and controlled the American economy, and he predicted dire societal
and economic consequences if the trusts continued to operate un-
15. 674 F.2d 1252 (9th Cir. 1982).
16. See infra notes 18-19.
17. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416, 429 (2d Cir.
1945): "Throughout the history of these statutes it has been constantly assumed that one of
their purposes was to perpetuate and preserve, for its own sake and in spite of possible cost,
an organization of industry in small units which can effectively compete with each other."
18. The Sherman Act, §§ 1, 2, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1982).
19. The Clayton Act, §§ 2, 3, 4, 4A-B, 5, 7, 16, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 14, 15, 15a-b, 16, 18, 26
(1982).
20. 1955 Ar'y GEN. REP. OF NAT'L COMM. TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS.
21. Id
22. The Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890); amended by ch. 690, Title VIII,
50 Stat. 693 (1937); amended by ch. 281, 69 Stat. 282 (1955) (current version is at 15 U.S.C.
§ 1 (1982)).
23. Senator Sherman's discussion of the purpose behind the Sherman Act during Con-
gressional debate evidences the prevailing beliefs and perceptions about the position the
trusts held in American society: "The popular mind is agitated with problems that may
disturb social order, and among them all none is more threatening than the inequality of
condition, of wealth, and opportunity that has grown within a single generation out of the
concentration of capital into vast combinations to control production and trade and to break
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checked by federal regulation.24 Hence, the Sherman Act was the re-
sponse to this perceived economic crisis.
B. The Right to Petition
Petitioning for redress of greivances historically has been a signifi-
cant component of governmental systems.25 To a large extent, however,
American jurisprudence has afforded the right to petition cursory treat-
ment;26 there is a dearth of decisions that deal exclusively with this
First Amendment right.27 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has recog-
24. Senator Sherman stated, 'These combinations already defy or control powerful
transportation corporations and reach State authorities. They reach out their Briarean arms
to every part of our country. They are imported from abroad. Congress alone can deal with
them, and if we are unwilling or unable there will soon be a trust for every production and a
master to fix the price for every necessity of life." 21 CONG. REc. 2455, 2460 (1890). The
Sherman Act was promulgated to protect the American public and economy from the dele-
terious effects of behemoth corporate enterprises-to tie the hands of the many armed mon-
ster. For an interesting discussion of the historical importance of the Sherman and Clayton
Acts, see Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623, 648-54 (1977) (Stevens, I., dissent-
ing) and accompanying notes.
25. It has long been recognized that the right to petition the government for redress of
grievances is a fundamental right and an attribute of national citizenship. See United States
v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 552. This ancient right pre-existed the Constitution's guarantee;
the right to petition was included in the Magna Carta, the Declaration of Rights, and the
Declaration of Independence. Magna Carta para. 52, 55, 56, 57 (Eng. 1215); Declaration of
Rights para. 10, res. 4 and para. 14., res. 8 (U.S. 1774); The Declaration of Independence
para. 30 (U.S. 1776). The American colonists, for instance, exercised this right in their un-
successful attempts to resolve their disagreements with England: "In every stage of these
oppressions we have petitioned for redress in the most humble terms; our repeated petitions
have been answered only by repeated injury." The Declaration of Independence para. 30
(U.S. 1776).
26. During his tenure as Governor of California, Edmund G. Brown commented on the
limited number of cases involving the right to petition: "We are all aware of the great surge
of litigation, often involving the Supreme Court itself, that in recent years helped to mark
the boundaries of the privileges of freedom of speech, press, assembly, and religion. But
strangely enough there are few cases that deal similarly with the freedom to petition ...
[Tlhe legal limits of 'proper' petitioning are unclear, and there are some doubts even as to
basic principles." Brown, The Right to Petition: Political or Legal Freedom?, 8 UCLA L.
REv. 729, 730-731 (1961).
27. As one commentator noted: "The paucity of holdings directly founded on this right
led Mr. Justice Story to describe it with meaningless verbiage and Mr. Cooley to state, 'Hap-
pily the occasions for discussing and defending it have not been numerous in this country
.... Note, The Right to Petition, 55 W. VA. L. REv. 275, 276 (1953).
One theory maintains that the right to petition is almost meaningless in a democratic
republic. The reason for the right's unimportance in our governmental system may be
traced to the fact that the American citizen "possesses a higher right, in which the inferior is
overshadowed and reduced to insignificance, the right of dictation.. . . The American citi-
zen possesses the freedom of speech, of the press, and of the ballot box. Every newly pro-
posed reform has free scope and play through these instruments, to work out that conviction
in the public mind requisite to make it practically effectual. The privilege of addressing
prayer to the temporary depositaries of governmental authority delegated from the individ-
ual citizen himself, constitutes no enlarging or strengthening addition to these means of
nized petitioning as "among the most precious liberties safeguarded by
the Bill of Rights."28
The Constitution does not establish limitations on petitioning ac-
tivity; it merely recognizes petitioning as a pre-existing right of the peo-
ple and provides that "Congress shall make no law. . abridging" the
right to petition.2 9 In several decisions, however, the Supreme Court
has clarified, to a limited degree, the extent and nature of this right.
The subject matter of the petition is not confined solely to political or
religious issues.3" Further, the right need not originate in an assem-
blage,31 and may be exercised in any governmental forum, including
Congress, the judiciary, and administrative agencies.32 The right to pe-
tition encompasses the right to present the petition, as well as a corre-
sponding duty of the government to receive and consider the
petitions.33 Further, both the right to present and the duty to receive
influence. What cares he for this privilege? If desirous of carrying out any particular reform,
can he not write freely for it in newspapers and Reviews--can he not speak freely for it, at
the street corners, from the house tops, in the frequent popular assemblages. . .?" Coyler,
The Right ofPettion, DEMOCRATIC REV., Apr. 1840, at 326, 337-38. Although this interpre-
tation of the significance of the right to petition was presented some 140 years ago, the
premise is still valid; perhaps this theory is even more viable in the modern, American tech-
nological society, with the expansive judicial interpretations given to the freedoms of speech,
press, and assembly.
A contrary view, however, is that the right to petition is one of the pre-eminent First
Amendment guarantees; as one of the two enumerated rights in the Constitution, the right to
petition should be accorded more deference by the Framers than the other enumerated free-
doms. The other enumerated right is the Second Amendment's right to bear arms.
28. United Mine Workers of Am., Dist. 12 v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 222
(1967).
Similarly, Justice Brennan has commented on the significance of the right to petition:
"The petition is especially suited for the exercise of all these [First Amendment] rights: It
serves as a vehicle of communication; as a classic means of individual affiliation with ideas
or opinions; and as a peaceful yet effective method of amplifying the views of the individual
signers. Indeed, the petition is a traditionally favored method of expression and participa-
tion." Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 363 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
29. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
30. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 531 (1945).
31. See, e.g., American Fed'n of Labor v. Reilly, 113 Colo. 90, 155 P.2d 145 (1945).
32. Caifornia Motor Transport, 404 U.S. at 510. "The same philosophy governs the ap-
proach of citizens or groups of them to administrative agencies (which are both creatures of
the legislature, and arms of the executive) and to courts, the third branch of Government."
33. Historically, in both England and the United States, the duty to receive petitions
excluded "two great categories of petitions from being received: those that are couched in
unbecoming language, and those that are evidently outside of the competence of parliament
or congress." 2 H. VON HOIST, THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES 249 (1888). An early Supreme Court decision which holds that an individ-
ual may be liable for libelous statements maliciously made in a petition is consistent with the
traditional exclusion of petitions "couched in unbecoming language." See White v. Nich-
olls, 44 U.S.(3 How.) 266, 291 (1845) (presumption that a petition is a privileged communi-
cation and not made maliciously may be overcome; petitioner can be sued for libelous
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petitions are subject to certain restrictions. 4
The paramount role the right to petition plays in our governmen-
tal and political system is evidenced by the pre-eminence of this consti-
tutional provision over much federal legislation, as well as the common
law. For example, in Gorman Towers, Inc. v. Bogoslavsky7l the defend-
ants' exercise of their right to petition to effectuate a change in the zon-
ing laws conflicted with the goals of section 1983 of the Civil Rights
Act.36 The Eighth Circuit stated that it was "loathe to interpret section
1983 to proscribe what we thus understand to be traditional political
activity."37 The court, therefore, applied "principles recognized in East-
est abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation" on
petitioning). But see City of Long Beach v. Bozek, 31 Cal. 3d 527, 538-39, 645 P.2d 137, 143,
183 Cal. Rptr. 86, 92 (1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 712 (1983) ("[W]e hold that governmen-
tal entities may not maintain actions for malicious prosecution against those who have pre-
viously sued such entities without success; the bringing of suits against the government is
absolutely privileged and cannot form the basis for imposition of civil liability for malicious
prosecution.").
Further, the governmental body must be competent to receive the petitions. These re-
quirements combine to provide precedence for the Court's statement in the California Motor
Transport decision that "[m]isrepresentations, condoned in the political arena, are not im-
munized when used in the adjudicatory process." 404 U.S. at 513. See infra notes 62-63 and
accompanying text.
34. It is important to distinguish between petitioning that is absolutely protected by the
First Amendment and activity that is not a valid exercise of the right to petition. For in-
stance, the Court noted in its decision in White that libelous petitions which are maliciously
made are not protected by the First Amendment. This holding can be reached by either of
two paths of legal analysis: 1) petitions that are libelous are not valid First Amendment
petitions and not subject to protection; 2) such petitions are a valid exercise of the First
Amendment right to petition but may be balanced against other considerations, such as the
need to protect citizens from libel.
35. 626 F.2d 607 (8th Cir. 1980).
36. The Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) (providing a cause of action for any
person deprived of constitutional or civil rights by any person acting under the color of state
law).
In Gorman Towers, a developer and an architect filed suit against public officials, land-
owners, and their attorney, alleging that defendants rezoned a property site from multiple
family to single and duplex classifications. Plaintiffs, who had planned to construct an
apartment complex for elderly or physically handicapped persons on the affected property,
alleged inter alia that the rezoning deprived them of equal protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment and contravened § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act. It was "apparent that the city
directors' rezoning was without rational basis and therefore deprived appellants of property
without the due process or equal protection guaranteed them by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment." 626 F.2d at 611. The private residents, nonetheless, were insulated from § 1983 lia-
bility by the First Amendment. The Eighth Circuit adopted "the district court's holding that
the private citizens and their lawyer were absolutely privileged by the First Amendment to
petition for the zoning amendment that caused plaintiffs' damages." Id at 614. The circuit
court noted that the defendants' actions were lobbying efforts; the genuineness of these ef-
forts was evidenced by the defendants' success in obtaining the zoning amendment. Id at
615.
37. Gorman Towers, 626 F.2d at 615.
Winter 1984] THE NOERR-PENNINGTON DOCTRINE 335
em Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc." It held
that "private citizens and their lawyer[s] were absolutely privileged by
the First Amendment to petition for the zoning amendment that caused
plaintiffs' damages. ' 38 Further, the court indicated that evidence of
either access barring or an independently illegal act were prerequisites
to a sham cause of action.39 Application of the provisions of section
1983 of the Civil Rights Act gave way to the constitutionally protected
right to petition in order to prevent any chilling of the First Amend-
ment right.'
Similarly, in Sierra Club v. Butz,4 the district court held that the
plaintiffs were immunized from liability to a timber company for dam-
ages caused by contractual interference during plaintiffs' attempts to
have certain timber lands reclassified as wilderness areas. The court
reasoned that,
all persons, regardless of motive are guaranteed by the First
Amendment the right to seek to influence the government or its
officials to adopt a new policy, and they cannot be required to
compensate another for loss occasioned by a change in policy
should they not be successful.
42
To summarize, courts have insulated bona fide petitioning activity
from liability predicated on the contravention of many federal statutes
or the common law.
43
Hence, although the parameters of the right are hazy and the defi-
nition of what constitutes a First Amendment petition is unsettled, "[i]t
was not by accident or coincidence that the rights to freedom of speech
and press were coupled in a single guaranty with the rights to assemble
and to petition for redress of grievances."'  Unquestionably, the right
38. Id at 614.
39. The Eighth Circuit noted that, "[a]ppellants here did not allege the individual de-
fendants abused the legislative process by, for example, buying votes with bribes. Nor did
appellants allege that they were prevented from answering defendants' charges or making
lobbying efforts of their own." Id at 615. The court, therefore, found the conduct alleged
by the plaintiffs insufficient to trigger the sham exception. Id
40. In Stem v. United States Gypsum, Inc., 547 F.2d 1329 (7th Cir. 1977), the Seventh
Circuit stated that, "[clonstruction of § 1985(1) [of the Civil Rights Act] to apply a federal
damage remedy. . . would raise grave constitutional questions. . . we have no doubt that
the prospect of a federal lawsuit resulting from any citizen complaint about the conduct of
federal officials could chill the exercise of the right to petition." Id at 1343. The court noted
that "[t]he public criticism of governmental policy and those responsible for government
operations is at the very core of the constitutionally protected free speech area. . . . We
think it plain that presenting complaints to responsible government officials about the con-
duct of their subordinates with whom the complainer has had official dealings is analogously
central to the protections of the right to petition." Id at 1342-43.
41. 349 F. Supp. 934 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
42. Id at 938.
43. See also White v. Nicholls, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 266, 287 (1845).
44. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. at 530.
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to petition has "a paramount and preferred place in our democratic
system."45
C. The Conflict Between the Antitrust Statutes and the Right to
Petition
In some instances, an exercise of the right to petition, a crucial
component of the constitutional charter of personal and political lib-
erty,46 may cause an anticompetitive effect that violates the Sherman
Act, America's economic charter of liberty.4 7 For example, an individ-
ual may employ the right to petition the government by initiating or
supporting legislation that would result in high entry or maintenance
costs for a particular business or industry. The increased costs caused
by this lobbying could have a detrimental impact on the petitioning
party's competitors and constrain competition in the affected market.48
This petitioning activity may qualify as either monopolizing anticom-
petitive conduct under section 2 of the Sherman Act49 or an illegal re-
straint of trade per section 1 of the Sherman Act.5" When the exercise
of the right to petition causes an anticompetitive effect that contravenes
the Sherman Act's prohibitions, courts must determine which social
charter should predominate.
In response to this tension between political and economic liber-
ties, the Supreme Court promulgated the Noerr-Pennington doctrine:
First Amendment petitioning must take priority over the goals of the
Sherman Act.51 Thus, in many instances, the doctrine will immunize
45. ACLU v. Board of Educ., 55 Cal. 2d 167, 178, 359 P.2d 45, 51, 10 Cal. Rptr. 647,
653, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 819 (1961).
46. The right to petition is essential to our democratic system of government: "The very
idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right on the part of its citizens ... to
petition for a redress of grievances." United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 552.
47. The antitrust laws operate to protect and promote the competitive processes of the
United States economy: "The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of
economic liberty aimed at free and unfettered competition as a rule of trade." Northern
Pac. R.R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1957).
48. In Noerr, 365 U.S. at 129-30, the Supreme Court was presented with a similar fact
situation.
49. Section 2 governs practices that lead to or perpetuate a firm's monopoly position in
a particular marketplace. See, e.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966);
United States v. E.I. du Pont deNemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957); United States v.
Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
50. Since its passage, courts traditionally have applied § 1 of the Sherman Act to pro-
hibit agreements in restraint of trade. See, e.g., Continental TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,
433 U.S. 36 (1977); United States v. TopCo Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
Tying and exclusive agreements have been regulated by § 1 of the Sherman Act and § 3
of the Clayton Act. See, e.g., International Business Machines Corp. v. United States, 298
U.S. 131 (1936); Fortner Enters., Inc. v. United States Steel Corp. [Former I], 394 U.S. 495
(1969).
51. See infra notes 53-79 and accompanying text.
petitioning activity from antitrust liability.
52
II. The Development of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine
The Supreme Court first recognized the tension between the exer-
cise of First Amendment petitioning and the antitrust laws in Eastern
Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.53 The
Court held that due to the essentially political nature of lobbying activ-
ity, attempts to influence the passage or enforcement of laws were ex-
empted from Sherman Act liability as an exercise of the right to
petition the government. 4
The Court noted that petitioning which is "ostensibly directed to-
ward influencing governmental action [could be] a mere sham to cover
what is actually nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly with
the business relationships of a competitor.""5 The Court thereby indi-
cated that such sham petitioning activity would not be entitled to im-
52. See, e.g., United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
53. 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
In Noerr, a group of truck operators and their trade association sued a group of rail-
roads, their association, and a public relations firm for violation of §§ I and 2 of the Sher-
man Act. The truck operators alleged that "the railroads had.. . conduct[ed] a publicity
campaign against the truckers designed to foster the adoption and retention of laws and law
enforcement practices destructive of the trucking business, to create an atmosphere of dis-
taste for the truckers. . . and their customers." Id at 129.
The Supreme Court reversed the district court's award of damages and imposition of an
injunction. The Court held "that no violation of the Act can be predicated upon mere at-
tempts to influence the passage or enforcement of laws." Id at 135.
The Supreme Court did not balance the right to petition against the governmental inter-
est in preventing anticompetitive conduct: "In a representative democracy such as this, these
branches of government [the legislature and the executive] act on behalf of the people and,
to a very large extent, the whole concept of representation depends upon the ability of the
people to make their wishes known to their representatives. To hold that the government
retains the power to act in this representative capacity and yet hold, at the same time, that
the people cannot freely inform the government of their wishes would impute to the Sher-
man Act a purpose to regulate, not business activity, but political activity, a purpose which
would have no basis whatever in the legislative history of that Act. Secondly, and of at least
equal significance, such a construction of the Sherman Act would raise important constitu-
tional questions. The right to petition is one of the freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights,
and we cannot, of course, lightly impute to Congress an intent to invade these freedoms."
Id at 137-38 (footnotes omitted).
54. For a complete account of this public relations battle, see Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.
v. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference, 155 F. Supp. 768, 773-811 (E.D. Pa. 1957), af d, 273
F.2d 218 (3d Cir. 1959), rev'a 365 U.S. 127 (1961). See also Note, Appeals to the Electorate
by Private Businesses: Infury to Competitors and the Right to Petition, 70 YALE L.J. 135
(1960). An interesting and thorough discussion of the history of lobbying and its relation to
Noerr may be found in Walden, More 4bout Noerr-Lobbying, 4ntitrust and the Right to
Petition, 14 UCLA L. Rav. 1211 (1967).
55. Noerr, 365 U.S. 127, 144 (1961).
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munity from antitrust liability under the First Amendment. 6 For
instance, if a party initiated petitioning with an intent to cause an an-
ticompetitive effect, and the petition was merely the means to that ef-
fect, then Sherman Act liability might attach. The Court did not
specify a standard for determining when petitioning activity should be
immunized from antitrust liability.
57
In United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington,5" the Supreme
Court reaffirmed and clarified the immunity promulgated in Noerr.
The Court stated that the presence or absence of an anticompetitive
purpose is irrelevant to the determination of whether the Noerr immu-
nity applies to disputed petitioning activity.59 Together the Noerr and
Pennington decisions stand for the proposition that any petitioning of
either the executive or legislative branches of government that pro-
duces an anticompetitive effect is immune from antitrust liability even
if initiated for an anticompetitive purpose.
The Supreme Court expanded the scope of the Noerr-Pennington
56. Id Initially, it was unclear whether the Court's decision was grounded on a statu-
tory interpretation of the Sherman Act or the First Amendment; in a footnote, the Court
stated that it was unnecessary to decide the constitutional question. Id at 132 n.6. In subse-
quent opinions, the Court has treated Noerr as a First Amendment decision. See Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 49 (1976); Calfornia Motor Transport, 404 U.S. at 508, 509-10 (1972).
For a critique of the Supreme Court's reasoning in Noerr, see Fischel, Antitrust Liability
for Attempts to Influence Government Action: The Basis and Limits of the Noerr-Pennington
Doctrine, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 80, 82-84 (1977).
57. Further, the Court did not indicate whether a "sham" petition was not immunized
because it was not within the First Amendment's purview, or whether it was protected peti-
tioning that had been limited because of the governmental interest in deterring anticompeti-
tive conduct. See supra note 34.
58. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
Pennington involved a cross-complaint by partners in a coal mining company against
the trustees of the United Mine Workers (UMW) alleging that the union trustees, the UMW,
and certain large coal operators had conspired to violate §§ I and 2 of the Sherman Act.
This conspiracy sought to eliminate small coal companies from the market by petitioning the
Secretary of Labor to obtain minimum wage requirements for employees of contractors sell-
ing coal to the Tennessee Valley Authority. This practice would increase the small compa-
nies' costs and make it difficult for them to compete with the large operators. Due to the
resultant cost constraints, the large companies could then wage a price cutting campaign and
drive the small companies out of the coal spot market. The Court held that the UMW's
pursuit of governmental action was immune from antitrust liability: "Noerr shields from the
Sherman Act a concerted effort to influence public officials regardless of intent or purpose."
Id. at 670.
59. The Court concluded that "[n]othing could be clearer from the Court's opinion [in
Noeri] than that [an] anticompetitive purpose did not illegalize the conduct . .. in-
volved .... Joint efforts to influence public officials do not violate the antitrust laws even
though intended to eliminate competition. Such conduct is not illegal, either standing alone
or as part of a broader scheme itself violative of the Sherman Act." Id at 669-70.
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doctrine in California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited6
The Court recognized that the judiciary and administrative agencies, as
vital and integral parts of our government, are included in the First
Amendment's right to petition guarantee. To insure unlimited and un-
fettered access to these bodies, the Court held that bona fide petitioning
in adjudicatory or administrative settings merits protection from anti-
trust liability equal to the protection afforded genuine efforts to influ-
ence the legislative or executive branches of government.6'
The Supreme Court noted in California Motor Transport that un-
ethical petitioning exercised in an administrative or adjudicatory set-
ting might vitiate the First Amendment protection, even though the
same conduct might be immunized when exercised in a political set-
ting.62 The Court based this differentiation between governmental fo-
rums on the greater potential for corruption and abuse of the
administrative and judicial processes through the use of unethical con-
duct.63  As in Noerr and Pennington, the Court in California Motor
Transport did not set forth a precise definition of sham petitioning.64
60. 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
In Caifornia Motor Transport, a group of highway carriers alleged that another group
of highway carriers had conspired to monopolize the transportation of goods market. The
plaintiffs asserted that the conspiracy was effectuated by the institution of state and federal
proceedings to resist and defeat the competition's applications to acquire, transfer, or regis-
ter operating rights; these acts prevented plaintiffs from free and unlimited access to the
agencies and courts. The Supreme Court upheld the Ninth Circuit's reversal of the district
court's dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a cause of action.
61. Id at 510-11.
62. Id at 513. The Court observed, "Misrepresentations, condoned in the political
arena, are not immunized when used in the adjudicatory process." Id The Court continued,
"Opponents before agencies or courts often think poorly of the other's tactics, motions, or
defenses and may readily call them baseless. One claim, which a court or agency may think
baseless, may go unnoticed; but a pattern of baseless, repetitive claims may emerge which
leads the factfinder to conclude that the administrative and judicial processes have been
abused. That may be a difficult line to discern and draw. But once it is drawn, the case is
established that abuse of those processes produced an illegal result, viz., effectively barring
respondents from access to the agencies and courts. Insofar as the administrative or judicial
processes are involved, actions of that kind cannot acquire immunity by seeking refuge
under the umbrella of 'political expression."' Id See supra note 33.
63. 404 U.S. at 512-13. The Supreme Court noted that "unethical conduct in the setting
of the adjudicatory process often results in sanctions. Perjury of a witness is one exam-
pie. . .. There are many other forms of illegal and reprehensible practice which may cor-
rupt the administrative or judicial processes and which may result in antitrust violations."
Id The Court then listed several types of unethical conduct that could result in antitrust
violations: bribing a public purchasing agent; excluding a competitor from a market by
obtaining a patent by fraud; or conspiring with a licensing authority. Id The Court indi-
cated that evidence of any of these activities is an indication of sham activity.
64. Although the Court stated that "a pattern of baseless, repetitive claims may emerge
which leads the factfinder to conclude that the administrative and judicial processes have
been abused," id, it did not indicate whether a pattern is a prerequisite for a sham cause of
action or merely indicative of sham activity.
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The Supreme Court shed some light on a standard by which to
identify sham activity in Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States.65 The
Court stated that, "the principle of Noerr may also apply to the use of
administrative or judicial processes where the purpose to suppress com-
petition is evidenced by repetitive lawsuits carrying the hallmark of in-
substantial claims .... 66 By adopting this language from California
Motor Transport, the Court presumably meant to establish a threshold
evidentiary showing of multiple, baseless suits before a sham cause of
action could be stated.
The Supreme Court further explored the status of sham litigation
in its plurality decision in Vendo Co. v. Lektro- Vend Corp.67 Vendo
involved the claim by a federal litigant that a single, ongoing state
court action qualified as an antitrust violation. The plaintiff sought to
enjoin the state court litigation, arguing that section 16 of the Clayton
Act68 is expressly excepted from the Anti-Injunction Act.69  The
Supreme Court refused to enjoin the ongoing state court suit on the
ground that an injunction was improper under the provisions of the
anti-injunction statute;7" the Court did not decide whether section 16's
provisions applied to the single state court action.7 The plurality opin-
ion did acknowledge that abuse of the judicial system could constitute
65. 410 U.S. 366 (1973), rehg denied, 411 U.S. 910 (1974).
In Otter Tail, the United States filed suit to enjoin certain practices of the Otter Tail
Power Co. as violative of § 2 of the Sherman Act. The government alleged that Otter Tail
had sought to protect its monopoly position in the retail power industry after Otter Tail's
franchise had expired by preventing towns from establishing their own replacement power
systems. The allegations of monopolizing conduct included litigation designed to delay or
prevent the establishment of municipal power systems. The Supreme Court remanded the
case to the district court for a determination of whether the litigation initiated by Otter Tail
was sham in light of the Court's intervening decision in California Motor Transport. On
remand, the district court held that the power company's repetitive use of litigation was
designed primarily to prevent the establishment of municipally operated power companies
and to perpetutate Otter Tail's monopoly. Otter Tail, 360 F. Supp. 451 (D. Minn. 1973).
66. 410 U.S. at 380 (citing California Motor Transport, 404 U.S. at 513).
67. 433 U.S. 623, reh'g denied, 434 U.S. 881 (1977).
68. Section 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1976), authorizes injunctive relief for
violations of the antitrust laws. To fall within the ambit of § 16, the Vendo plaintiffs had to
establish that the single state court action constituted an antitrust violation.
69. The Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1976), prohibits a federal court from
enjoining state court proceedings "except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or
where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments." To em-
ploy the provisions of the Anti-Injunction Act, the plaintiff must show either that § 16 was
an expressly authorized exception, or that enjoining the state court action was necessary for
the federal court to assert its jurisdiction over the matter.
70. A plurality of the Court held that § 16 was neither on its face nor under established
tests an expressly authorized exception to the Anti-Injunction Act. 433 U.S. at 631-35. Fur-
ther, the plurality held that issuance of an injunction was not necessary in aid of the federal
court's jurisdiction. Id at 641-43.
71. See infra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
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an antitrust violation;7 2 however, the Justices disagreed as to what type
of conduct would be sufficiently abusive to incur antitrust liability.73
Justice Rehnquist, joined in his opinion by Justices Stewart and
Powell, stated that California Motor Transport and Noerr "together
may be cited for the proposition that repetitive, sham litigation in state
courts may constitute an antitrust violation."'74 He did not indicate
whether such a showing should be mandatory for a sham cause of
action.
75
Concurring in the result, Justice Blackmun and the Chief Justice
stated that section 16 was not applicable to the state court proceeding
since the single state suit did not constitute an antitrust violation. Both
Justices believed that a pattern of baseless, repetitive suits was a pre-
requisite to a sham cause of action.76
The four dissenting members of the Court, Justices Stevens, Bren-
nan, White, and Marshall, insisted that the reasoning in Caiffornia Mo-
tor Transport allowed a single state court action to be the basis of an
antitrust violation.77 Further, Justice Stevens, author of the dissent,
stated that "[t)he mere fact that the Illinois courts concluded that the
petitioner's state-law claim was meritorious does not disprove the exist-
ence of a serious federal antitrust violation."7" Justice Stevens con-
cluded that the resolution of the state court action was irrelevant to a
determination of whether the suit constituted an antitrust violation.
Thus, the four dissenters also believed that a single meritorious lawsuit
could violate the antitrust laws.
A review of the Supreme Court's decisions pertaining to the inter-
action of the right to petition and the antitrust laws reveals a progres-
sive expansion of the immunity to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.
Concurrently, the Court has recognized a sham cause of action and
applied this exception to a broad range of activity. The parameters of
72. 433 U.S. at 635 n. 6, 644, 661-62.
73. See infra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
74. 433 U.S. at 635 n.6.
75. "[fJ]udicial decisions have construed the prohibition of the antitrust laws to include
sham and frivolous state-court proceedings-a premise with which we do not at all disa-
gree." Id at 637 n.8.
76. "[C]onsistently with the decision in Calfornia Motor Transport Co. I would
hold that no injunction may issue against currently pending state-court proceedings unless
those proceedings are themselves part of a 'pattern of baseless, repetitive claims' that are
being used as an anticompetitive device." Id at 644 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
77. "Manifestly, when Mr. Justice Douglas wrote for the Court in. . . [California Mo-
tor Transport] and described 'a pattern of baseless, repetitive claims,'. . . as an illustration
of an antitrust violation, he did not thereby circumscribe the category to that one example.
Nothing in his opinion even remotely implies that there would be any less reason to enjoin
the 'fu]se of a patent obtained by fraud to exclude a competitor from the market,'. . . for
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sham conduct remain unclear; in part, this lack of clarity may be traced
to a concomitant lack of precision regarding the scope of the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine. A definition of sham activity depends on a clear
identification of Noerr protected conduct.7 9 An imprecise definition of
petitioning merely exacerbates confusion about the scope of the sham
exception.
I1. A Critique of Noerr Sham Analysis
In many cases involving the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, courts
have merely touched upon the specific governmental forum and the
activity in question. Given the wide range of petitioning conduct-
lobbying an executive, a legislature, or a city council;80 initiating a law-
suit to enforce existing laws;"' filing a complaint before an administra-
tive agency82 an identification of the type of petitioning and the
79. There is an inverse relationship between the two concepts. A broad definition of the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine and a narrow definition of sham activity would result in the im-
position of antitrust liability in only a few situations. For example, courts could apply the
immunity to all petitioning activity except illegal conduct. Under this formulation, the sham
exception would apply only to instances when the governmental system was abused by overt
criminal conduct such as fraud or bribery. Pursuant to this broad definition of the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine, a business could freely challenge a competitor's applications for
licenses, permits, and rate changes. Hence, the aggressive use of an expansive immunity
could affect detrimentally a business' ability to function and compete in the marketplace.
Conversely, a broad definition of the sham exception would result in a restrictive defini-
tion of the Noerr-Pennington immunity. For instance, the doctrine could apply only to peti-
tioning that is exercised without an anticompetitive intent. The sham exception would then
apply to all petitioning conduct involving an intent to harm competition. Under this broad
formulation of the sham exception, a business could carry on petitioning activity in an abu-
sive manner. For example, a business seeking to obtain a business permit could use a broad
definition of sham activity as a weapon against potential challenges to the permit applica-
tion. A business that initiates a good faith challenge to a competitor's application for a
permit could be subject to a sham cause of action. The threat of a lawsuit could deter a
business from bringing legitimate challenges; the ultimate effect would be to chill the right to
petition. Thus, an excessively broad definition of the sham exception could emasculate the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine.
80. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Butz, 349 F. Supp. 934 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (plaintiffs lobbying
Secretary of Agriculture to recommend to Congress that a forest be declared a Wilderness
Area not liable for ensuing damages); Westborough Mall, Inc. v. City of Cape Girardeau,
532 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Mo. 1981) (petitioning city council for rezoning of land immunized
from liability); Weiss v. Willow Tree Civic Ass'n, 467 F. Supp. 803 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (appli-
cation for zoning permit ruled protected petitioning activity).
81. See, e.g., Taylor Drug Stores, Inc. v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 506 F.2d 211 (6th
Cir. 1977) (lawsuit filed by competitors to enforce a state Sunday closing law); Semke v.
Enid Automobile Dealers Ass'n, 456 F.2d 1361 (10th Cir. 1972) (petitioning pursuant to a
state statute requesting injunction); Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Codding, 615 F.2d 830 (9th Cir.
1980) (defendant filed or underwrote 13 lawsuits).
82. See, e.g., Calfornia Motor Transport, 404 U.S. 508 (1971) (discussed supra at notes
60-64 and accompanying text); Cloper Exxpress, 674 F.2d 1252 (9th Cir. 1982) (discussed
infra at notes 84-94 and accompanying text).
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nature of the forum is crucial for an accurate and fair standard. 3 For
instance, it would be pointless to apply to lobbying activity a test for
sham petitioning that required a pattern of baseless and repetitive
claims.
In Clpper Exxpress v. Rocky Mountain Motor Tarff Bureau,'s the
Ninth Circuit refined the definition of sham petitioning and elaborated
on the standards used to determine whether petitioning is immunized
from antitrust liability by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. The court an-
alyzed Noerr and its progeny and concluded that the purpose of the
doctrine is to confer "antitrust immunity for activity genuinely in-
tended to influence governmental action." 5 The court held that the
Rocky Mountain Motor Tariff Bureau's (RMMTB) intent in filing the
protests was "not determinative" of whether the protests qualified as
sham activity. 6 Rather, the protests fell within the sham exception be-
cause they were not genuine efforts to influence governmental action;
the ingenuine nature of the protests was evidenced by the defendants'
automatic filing of protests regardless of merit.8 7
The Ninth Circuit disagreed with RMMTB's interpretation of Cal-
[fornia Motor Transport. RMMTB argued that, "Trucking requires that
the alleged [petitioning] misconduct (1) consist of a pattern of repetitive
claims; (2) be baseless; and (3) bar access to the governmental body."8 8
83. Most commonly, courts have distinguished between abuse of the right to petition in
a political and an adjudicatory setting. See, e.g., California Motor Transport, 404 U.S. at
513.
84. 674 F.2d 1252 (9th Cir. 1982).
Clipper Exxpress is a freight forwarder governed by the provisions of the Interstate
Commerce Act (ICA). The Rocky Mountain Motor Tariff Bureau (RMMTB)-which was
created under the ICA's provisions-initiates, considers, and approves the rates and fares of
its member carriers; RMMTB represents approximately 80% of transcontinental transporta-
tion.
Under the provisions of the ICA, a freight forwarder must publish any rate changes. If
there is a protest to the proposed rate, then the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) may
suspend the new rate during the pendency of the protest. The new fares take effect automat-
ically if a protest is not lodged within 30 days of the rate's publication. Pursuant to these
requirements, Clipper published its new rates; a few days later, RMMTB protested the rate
change. During the ICC investigation, Clipper amended the initial rate change to increase
the rate's geographical range and to lower the published fare. Although RMMTB protested
each of Clipper's amendments, it was unable to prevent the implementation of the rate
changes. In 1972, Clipper filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California alleging that RMMTB's protests constituted sham petition-
ing and violated the Sherman Act. Id at 1256-57. Clipper alleged that RMMTB fied sham
protests before the ICC "'for the purpose of directly restricting, lessening, and prohibiting
the legitimate competition,' of freight forwarders." Id at 1257-58.
85. Id at 1264. The court also stated that "[w]hether something is a genuine effort to
influence governmental action, or a mere sham, is a question of fact." Id
86. Id
87. Id
88. Id at 1264-65.
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The court of appeals, however, determined that a multiplicity of suits is
not a prerequisite to the invocation of the sham exception; a single law-
suit could constitute sufficient interference with a business competi-
tor. 9 The court supported this conclusion by referring to the Supreme
Court's decision in California Motor Transport.90
The Ninth Circuit also dispensed with a requirement that the
plaintiff be denied free and unlimited access to administrative or judi-
cial processes.91 Instead, the court held that "some abuse of process,
although not necessarily access barring" would be required to invoke
the sham exception.92 Under this formulation, less severe or onerous
types of procedural abuse could warrant application of the sham excep-
tion. The Ninth Circuit retained a requirement that the claims be base-
less;93 the court noted two factors that would indicate whether protests
were baseless: the fact that "protests were filed automatically and with-
out regard to merit," and the fact that defendants did not prevail in any
of their protests.94
In sum, the court's analysis of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine and
the sham exception allows antitrust liability to be predicated on the
filing of a single meritorious lawsuit that merely results in some, but
not complete, access barring.95 Although the Ninth Circuit established
certain requirements and factors to be considered when analyzing po-
tential sham activity, the court lost sight of the purpose of the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine and its legal reasoning contained several fallacious
assumptions.
The Ninth Circuit accurately observed that, theoretically, a single
suit or protest could be an invalid exercise of First Amendment
rights.96 It does not necessarily follow, however, that any single lawsuit
would be a sufficient basis for the invocation of the sham exception.
The Supreme Court's language in California Motor Transport re-
89. Id. at 1266. The court stated, "If the activity is not genuine petitioning activity, the
antitrust laws are not suspended and continue to prohibit the violating activities. Because
application of the antitrust laws is not suspended, it will prohibit sham activity, whether that
activity consists of single or multiple sham suits. This analytical framework does not permit
a conclusion that single sham suits are protected under Noerr." Id.
90. "[A]bsent any contrary indication by the Supreme Court, there is no reason to be-
lieve that the Court intended to extend the sham exception only to cases involving repetitive
claims." Id.
91. Id.
92. Id at 1269.
93. Id. at 1267.
94. Id
95. The Ninth Circuit's decision finds some support in the dissent's opinion in Vendo,
433 U.S. at 662; see supra text accompanying note 67.
96. See California Motor Transport, 404 U.S. at 512-13. See also Fischel, supra note 56,
at 110.
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quiring a pattern of baseless, repetitive suits97 balances the right to pe-
tition the government against any anticompetitive effect the petitioning
activity may produce. This requirement protects the First Amendment
rights of those individuals who, in good faith, file unsuccessful lawsuits
that cause an anticompetitive effect. The pattern of baseless, repetitive
claims provides evidence of bad faith from which a court may reason-
ably infer an anticompetitive purpose violative of the Sherman Act; to
infer an anticompetitive purpose from the filing of a single, meritorious
lawsuit would chill the First Amendment right to petition.98 A pattern
of actions guarantees the full and free exercise of the First Amendment
but allows liability to attach to any conduct that violates the antitrust
laws.
To support its contention that a single meritorious lawsuit could
fall within the sham exception, the Ninth Circuit relied on the Califor-
nia Motor Transport list of activities that "in the setting of the adjudica-
tory process often results in sanctions." 99 The circuit court's reliance,
however, was misplaced. The Supreme Court in California Motor
Transport noted that any of the enumerated activities--such as paying
a witness, obtaining a patent by fraud to exclude a competitor from the
market, or conspiracy with a licensing agent--could constitute an anti-
trust violation." All of these examples involved illegal activities with-
out reference to antitrust law. Although the Ninth Circuit
acknowledged the difference between fraud or bribery and legal peti-
tioning,' 0 1 the court blithely dismissed any possible significance for the
distinction: "Defendants have not. . . presented any basis for finding
this distinction relevant."'0 2 The Ninth Circuit proceeded to equate
fraud with sham litigation. The court's next proposition, however, is
illogical: since fraud, one illegal act, could equal sham petitioning,
then litigation, one legal act, also equaled sham activity. The circuit
court sidestepped the crucial distinction between the two acts: the ille-
gal nature of the conduct.
A more accurate reading of California Motor Transport would al-
low either a single illegal lawsuit or a single lawsuit based on an illegal
act to constitute an antitrust violation. An illegal lawsuit reasonably
would support an inference of anticompetitive purpose. It would be
improper, however, to infer an anticompetitive purpose from one legal
act-the filing of a single, meritorious lawsuit. When bona fide law-
suits are involved, one way to support an inference of anticompetitive
97. 404 U.S. at 513. The language employed by the Court is quoted at supra note 62.
98. For a discussion of why there would be a chilling effect on the right to petition, see
infra notes 127-28 and accompanying text.
99. 404 U.S. at 512.
100. Id at 512-13.
101. Cl/per, 674 F.2d at 1266 n.23.
102. Id
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purpose is a showing of a pattern of baseless, repetitive suits.' 3
The Ninth Circuit's elimination of access barring as a prerequisite
to a sham cause of action was based on the Supreme Court's decision in
Otter Tail.'" The circuit court, however, did not discuss the critical
distinctions between the facts of Otter Tail and Clpper.
In Otter Tail, the district court found that the Otter Tail Power
Company had refused either to wholesale power to municipal systems
or to transfer power from other systems over Otter Tail's facilities; fur-
ther, Otter Tail had invoked transmission contract provisions to fore-
stall other companies from supplying power. The court held that the
sole purpose for these actions was to prevent the municipal systems
from eroding Otter Tail's monopoly position in the power market. '0 5
In addition, the government alleged that Otter Tail had committed an
anticompetitive act by instituting sham litigation.10 6
Despite the absence of any allegation or showing of access bar-
ring,0 7 the court held that the litigation qualified as sham activity."'S
This conclusion was justified in light of an overwhelming evidentiary
showing of Otter Tail's anticompetitive conduct independent from the
filing of the lawsuits: the company's refusal to wholesale or transfer
power and the invocation of the contract provision gave rise to a rea-
sonable inference of anticompetitive purpose. In effect, the antitrust
case against Otter Tail was established regardless of the sham
litigation.109
103. See infra note 130 and accompanying text.
104. "[Tlhe Court [in Otter Tail] held that a cause of action under the sham exception
was made out in the absence of any allegation of access barring." Clpper, 674 F.2d at 1267-
68 (discussing Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973), on remand, 360 F.
Supp. 451 (D.C. Minn. 1973), a~fdmem., 417 U.S. 901 (1974)).
105. "Its control over transmission facilities in much of its service area gives it substantial
effective control over potential competition from municipal ownership. By its refusal to sell
or wheel power, defendant prevents that competition from surfacing." 331 F. Supp. 54, 61
(D. Minn. 1971).
106. 331 F. Supp. at 61-62.
107. The district court rendered its final decision without any showing of access barring.
See 360 F. Supp. 451 (D. Minn. 1973), a~fdmena, 417 U.S. 901 (1974).
108. In its initial opinion, the district court held that the litigation violated the Sherman
Act. The court ruled that the litigation was not immune from antitrust liability since the
Noerr immunity was applicable "only to efforts aimed at influencing the legislative and ex-
ecutive branches of the government." 331 F. Supp. at 62. The Supreme Court vacated and
remanded the part of the district court's holding dealing with Noerr "for consideration in
light of [the Court's] intervening decision in Cal//ornia Motor Transport." 410 U.S. at 380.
On remand, the district court held that "the repetitive use of litigation by Otter Tail was
timed and designed principally to prevent the establishment of municipal electric systems
and thereby to preserve defendant's monopoly," 360 F. Supp. 451 and fell within the sham
exception.
109. Otter Tail, 331 F. Supp. at 61. The district court determined that Otter Tail had
monopoly power in the relevant market and that the refusal to deal and invocation of con-
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Unlike Otter Tail, the single allegation of anticompetitive activity
in Clipper was based on the exercise of the right to petition. The Ninth
Circuit did not refer to any evidence of anticompetitive activity other
than petitioning to support the court's waiver of the access barring re-
quirement. Since the only allegation of anticompetitive conduct was
the filing of rate protests, a showing of access barring would have been
one way to give rise to the requisite inference of an anticompetitive
purpose."10
The defendants in Cloper asserted that the elimination of an ac-
cess barring requirement would result in the chilling of First Amend-
ment rights."' The Ninth Circuit cavalierly dismissed this possibility
with the statement that "[diefendants have not shown how their first
amendment rights have been infringed by the antitrust laws.""'  This
statement presaged the court's dramatic shift in the protections af-
forded by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. In effect, the Ninth Circuit's
formulation would require the defendants to bear the burden of dem-
onstrating that their conduct was a proper exercise of First Amendment
rights; there would be a presumption that the defendants' petitioning
activities were subject to the antitrust laws.
Traditional Noerr-Pennington analysis presumes that petitioning is
a valid exercise of First Amendment rights; a strong evidentiary show-
ing is required to rebut this presumption of constitutional validity." 3
In Clpper, the Ninth Circuit "presumed" that petitioning activity is
constitutionally invalid; the court inverted the scope and purpose of
both the Noerr-Pennington doctrine and the sham exception.
Hence, the Ninth Circuit in Clpper lowered the evidentiary
threshhold needed to fall within the sham exception and thereby ex-
panded the scope of the exception. The constitutional priority afforded
petitioning by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine is lost under the Ninth
Circuit's expansive definition of sham petitioning; the exception engulfs
the doctrine." 4 The sham exception, however, should be an exception:
it should apply to a narrow range of conduct.
The trend in the antitrust field favoring the sham exception can be
tract provisions constituted monopolizing conduct. Id Thus, even without the sham litiga-
tion, the Government had proven all of the elements of a § 2 Sherman Act violation.
110. A showing that the repetitive claims were baseless also would have been sufficient to
raise the anticompetitive inference. See infra note 131 and accompanying text.
11. Cliper, 674 F.2d at 1269. "Defendants claim that if we did not require access bar-
ring, every competitor who was adversely affected by the filing of a protest would file an
antitrust suit against the protesting party. This increased litigation, defendants claim, would
deter the exercise of first amendment rights." Id
112. Id
113. See, e.g., Noerr, 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
114. Under the Ninth Circuit's formulation, the filing of a single suit that does not result
in access barring could be a sufficient basis for a sham cause of action. See supra notes 89
and I I I and accompanying text.
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traced, in part, to the deference accorded to the antitrust statutes. ' 5
The shift away from the Noerr immunity may be based on a perception
that the business community excessively abuses the right to petition.'
1 6
The expansion of the sham exception probably is tied to judicial efforts
to rein in unbridled abuses of this First Amendment right. Unchecked
expansion of the sham exception, however, merely emasculates the No-
err immunity without effectively curtailing abusive petitioning conduct.
To effectuate the goals of both the antitrust laws and the right to peti-
tion, courts must promulgate and consistently apply a practical and
reasonable standard that identifies deleterious petitioning conduct.
IV. A Proposed Standard for Treating a Claim of Sham
Activity
A. The Threshold Inquiry: Antitrust Violation
The first inquiry in determining whether the sham exception
should apply is to ascertain if the activity would violate the antitrust
laws. The Supreme Court has developed "rules under which it has
avoided passing upon a large part of all constitutional questions."'1 7
One such rule states that,
[t]he Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although
properly presented by the record, if there is also present some
other ground upon which the case may be disposed of...
Thus, if a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one in-
volving a constitutional question, the other a question of statu-
tory construction or general law, the Court will decide only the
115. The antitrust laws are accorded deference similar to that afforded the right to peti-
tion; this deference is based on the vital role these laws play in protecting and maintaining
our free enterprise system. As the Supreme Court noted in its opinion in United States v.
Topco Assocs.: "Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna
Carta of free enterprise. They are as important to the preservation of economic freedom and
our free enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental per-
sonal freedoms. And the freedom guaranteed each and every business, no matter how small,
is the freedom to compete-to assert with vigor, imagination, devotion, and ingenuity
whatever economic muscle it can muster." 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
The Supreme Court has likened the nature and scope of the Sherman Act to that of
constitutional law: "As a charter of [economic] freedom the [Sherman] Act has a generality
and adaptability comparable to that found to be desirable in constitutional provision." Ap-
palachian Coals v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359-66 (1933). The Noerr-Pennington doc-
trine then, must balance the right of one citizen to exercise his constitutionally guaranteed
right to petition, against another citizen's fundamental economic right to compete, as guar-
anteed by the antitrust statutes.
116. One commentator has suggested that the exercise of the right to petition in a busi-
ness context should be treated as commercial speech. See Note, The Sham Exception to the
Noerr-Pennington Doctrine: A Commercial Speech Interpretation, 49 BRooKLYN L. REv.
573 (1983).
117. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 346, reh'T denied, 297 U.S.
728 (1936) (Brandeis, J., dissenting in part).
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latter.1 ""
This rule is based partly on the Court's interest in avoiding unnecessary
resolution of federal constitutional issues.'1 9 Application of this rule to
Noerr-Penninglon cases will allow courts to eliminate a number of these
suits from their dockets. 2 ° Thus, when confronted with an action in
which the right to petition and the antitrust laws appear to conflict, the
court should initially determine whether the conduct alleged in the
complaint based on an interpretation of the facts favorable to the plain-
tiff constitute a violation of the antitrust laws.
For instance, a monopolization offense under section 2 of the
Sherman Act requires proof that the defendant has monopoly power
and that the monopoly was obtained or maintained by monopolizing
conduct. If the defendant does not have monopoly power in the rele-
vant market, then the case may be dismissed summarily and the court
need never decide the issue of monopolizing conduct. The court could
avoid addressing the thorny issues involved in the clash between the
First Amendment and the antitrust laws. If a review of the case shows
that the allegations of the complaint are sufficient to plead an antitrust




Antitrust liability may be predicated on petitioning exercised in
many ways and in several governmental forums.122 The first step of a
test to judge whether petitioning activity is sham conduct is to identify
the specific type and the situs of the petitioning. This identification is
crucial: petitioning activity that would be legal when exercised in one
governmental forum could, in a different forum, be an illegal exercise
118. 297 U.S. at 347.
119. See, e.g., Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 104 S. Ct. 900, 939-42
(1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 571 (1947).
120. As Justice Brandeis noted, by disposing of a case on statutory grounds, courts could
"avoid passing upon a large part of all" such troublesome cases. A4shwander, 297 U.S. at 346
(Brandeis, J., dissenting in part).
121. In certain antitrust cases it may be easier for the court to decide the constitutional
issue before the antitrust issues. For instance, cases involving a determination of whether a
political boycott violates the provisions of the Sherman Act involve complex and difficult
antitrust issues. Resolution of such cases would be facilitated and expedited by deciding the
case on constitutional grounds rather than antitrust grounds. Hence, many political boycott
cases could be dismissed based on the immunity afforded such political speech. See, e.g.,
Missouri v. NOW, 467 F. Supp. 289 (W.D. Mo. 1979), afl'a 620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842 (1980). See generaly, Note, Political Boycott Activity and the First
4mendment, 91 HARv. L. REv. 659 (1978); Note, NO Wor Never: Is There Antitrust Liability
for Noncommercial Boycotts4 80 COLUM. L. REv. 1317 (1980).
122. See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
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of the right to petition.' 23 For instance, petitioning in the courts must
be carefully scrutinized to insure that it does not impinge on integrity
or impartiality; courts must respond to legal, not political,
persuasion.124
The nature and purpose of the governmental forum may alter the
degree of tolerance afforded the petitioning. A less stringent standard
should be applied to judge petitioning in political arenas as opposed to
the standard applied to petitioning in the judiciary. 25 The Noerr-Pen-
nington doctrine should create a fluid immunity-shielding conduct in
one forum, yet subjecting the same conduct to liability when it occurs
in a different forum.
The next step in the proposed analysis is to determine if the anti-
trust claim is predicated solely on petitioning activity or if there is evi-
dence of additional anticompetitive conduct.1 26 This determination is
crucial if both the First Amendment right to petition and the Sherman
Act's right to compete are to be afforded maximum protection. Evi-
dence of additional nonpetitioning, anticompetitive conduct should
support the requisite inference of anticompetitive purpose.
Based on these determinations-the type of petitioning, the gov-
ernmental forum involved, and evidence of additional anticompetitive
activity-a court should be able to identify sham conduct. The follow-
ing classifications of sham conduct are mandated by balancing these
interests and the goals of both the right to petition and the antitrust
laws.
123. See supra note 62.
124. See United States v. Michigan, 460 F. Supp. at 639. The court in Michigan stated:
"[T]he right of access to the court-which is but another way of phrasing the right to petition
the court for redress of grievances-should not be confused with the right to present signed
petitions advocating a certain result in a case to which neither the signers Inlor their associa-
tion is a party. The former is a constitutionally protected right. . . . The latter is a blatant
attempt to influence the decision of this federal court .... " Id.
Of course, courts must be careful not to unduly restrict an individual's ability to present
and argue his case. Our judicial system is based on advocacy, and in an attempt to curb
improper petitioning activity, an overzealous restriction on the presentation of opinionated
evidence would have an effect on the judicial system equally deleterious as that of unfettered
and unrestricted petitioning.
125. As the Supreme Court noted in Noerr, "In a representative democracy such as this,
these branches of government [the legislative and the executive] act on behalf of the people
. " 365 U.S. at 137. Yet, in California Motor Transport the Court observed that
"[m]isrepresentations, condoned in the political arena, are not immunized when used in the
adjudicatory process." 404 U.S. at 513. See generally supra note 33.
126. For discussion of additional nonpetitioning anticompetitive conduct, see Otter Tail,
331 F. Supp. at 61.
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C. Guidelines for Ascertaining Sham Activity
Without other indicia of anticompetitive conduct, one legal peti-
tioning act should be insufficient to raise a presumption of anticompeti-
tive purpose and should not constitute sham petitioning. If a single
legal petitioning act could be subject to antitrust liability then the insti-
tution of legitimate as well as ingenuine petitioning would be discour-
aged. Some good faith petitioners would not exercise their First
Amendment rights because of the possibility of facing an antitrust suit
based on the single petitioning act.
A single legal petitioning act that completely bars access to a gov-
ernmental forum should be considered sham.1 27 The requisite an-
ticompetitive purpose reasonably can be inferred from the total access
barring. Any chilling effect on petitioning is justified in light of the
onerous effect on unfettered access to governmental forums.
Likewise, when a single petitioning act is based upon illegal con-
duct-such as bribery, fraud, or malicious prosecution-then the peti-
tioning is sham.' 2  The requisite anticompetitive purpose can be
inferred from the use of an illegal act.
A single petitioning act that is merely one phase of a larger an-
ticompetitive scheme, as evidenced by additional nonpetitioning an-
ticompetitive acts, will fall into the sham exception.' 29 The additional
anticompetitive acts support the inference needed for the imposition of
antitrust liability.
A series of petitioning acts constitute sham activity when the acts
are baseless. 3 Evidence of baselessness supports the inference of an
anticompetitive purpose. In determining whether the suits are baseless,
a court may consider whether the petitions were filed automatically and
regardless of merit, and whether they were successful.
t Similarly, repetitive petitioning that either completely bars access
to a governmental forum or is part of an independent anticompetitive
scheme will support the requisite anticompetitive inference.' Such
conduct must fall into the sham exception.
The most difficult case for sham analysis entails repetitive petition-
ing that either results in partial access barring or involves only a few
baseless acts. Only an evidentiary showing of both partial access bar-
ring and some baseless cases should give rise to the requisite anticom-
127. See, e.g., Caifornia Motor Transport, 404 U.S. 508; see supra notes 60-62 and accom-
panying text; see generally Balmer, Sham Litigation and the Antitrust Laws, 29 BUFFALO L.
Rav. 39 (1980).
128. Balmer, supra note 127; see supra note 63 and accompanying text.
129. See, e.g., Otter Tail, 410 U.S. 366; see supra note 65 and accompanying text.
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petitive inference. Absent a showing of both of these factors, the
repetitive petitioning will be protected by the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine.
Conclusion
The line between protected First Amendment petitioning and in-
genuine conduct must be drawn carefully. This distinction is crucial if
the goals of both the right to petition and the antitrust laws are to be
effectuated. Stringent application of sham analysis will provide a
bright line to separate spurious and genuine petitioning conduct,
thereby reconciling the charter of personal and political freedom with
the economic charter of freedom.
